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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
William K. Bachelder*
Admissibility of X-Rays of Stomach to Prove Person Swallowed Stolen Objects
-The recent case of Taylor v. State, 213 P. 2d 588 (Okla. Cr. App. 1950),
suggests an appropriate police procedure for obtaining evidence that a person swal-
lowed stolen objects, such as rings or other jewelry. In that case the prosecution
offered in evidence an x-ray taken of the stomach of a witness which showed the
presence of metal rings. The purpose of using this x-ray was to corroborate the
testimony of the witness that the defendant had been his accomplice in several
robberies. The x-ray helped to verify his story about the last of these robberies
at which time the witness had swallowed the rings in order to prevent their
seizure as evidence.
If the police should use a stomach pump or give an enema to a person who has
swallowed evidence, some courts may regard this as an unreasonable search and
seizure and suppress the evidence. (See the last volume of this Journal, at p.
535.) It may be advisable for the police to fortify themselves with an x-ray of the
accused person's stomach before resorting to these other more drastic methods of
obtaining the objects themselves just in case the court should exclude from evidence
the objects so obtained. An x-ray may be considered a reasonable and proper method
of search and so would still be available as good evidence of the swallowing of the
objects in question.
Effect of Illegal Wire-Tapping on the Use of Other Evidence Against Accused
Persons-In United States v. Coplon, (S.D.N.Y., 1950), the defendants to an
espionage charge wanted to prove that at one time the F.B.I. had been set on their
trail by an informer who had tapped their wires while they were planning their
actions. However, the indictment of the defendants was based on the later crime
itself rather than the planning of it, and the Government had obtained all its
information for this indictment by lawful means. For this reason the court held
that the illegal act of the informer was immaterial since the prosecution was not
based on anything learned illegally. As the court said, criminal ventures "may
not be carried out and perfected with impunity, for no license or privilege to
commit a crime is conferred on wrongdoers by reason of the fact that the wires
over which they talk are unlawfully tapped." However, this case should not be
construed to condone wire-tapping, or to change in any way the practice in federal
courts of excluding information obtained directly or indirectly as a result of wire-
tapping. All the case says is that the defendant, to get advantage of this exclusionary
rule, must show that the information sought to be excluded was obtained in that
way. Here the F.B.I. gathered its information for the trial in processes unrelated
to the wire-tapping.
A Confession to a Crime Will Not by Itself Result in Conviction-Although
the police may have a completely unchallenged confession by a defendant that
he has committed a crime, they may still be unable to convict him. This is
illustrated in Parker v. State, 89 N.E. 2d 442 (Ind. 1950), where a conviction
was reversed even though the police had the defendant's confession to a mur-
der and had dug up bones around where the defendant confessed to burying
his alleged victim. This extra evidence was not enough in Indiana to prove
that a crime had been committed, and until there is proof of the existence
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of a crime anybody's confession is immaterial. Courts say that there must be
some independent proof of the corpus delicti, which means that there must be proof
that a crime has been committed, apart from any proof that a certain person com-
mitted the crime. This rule developed out of the fear that people, as a result of
their own mental delusions or of pressure applied to them, would confess to
fictitious crimes. The many states in the United States are not uniform as to
how much of this extra evidence is necessary. There are three rules. (1) The
most strict states require that there be other evidence wholly independent of the
confession which establishes that there was a crime committed. (2) Others say
that there must be some evidence besides the confession, but part of the job of
proving existence of a crime can be done by the confession. (3) A few states will
permit the existence of a crime to be proved by the confession alone, if there is
some outside evidence, no matter how unrelated to this particular crime, which
tends to show that the confession is probably true. It can be seen that in no state
can the police come into court with just a confession and expect to get a conviction.
It is important for the police to know just how much of this outside evidence is
necessary in their state. This can be found in Wigmore, Evidence (1940) §§2071-
2075. (Also see Vol. 30, page 261 of this Journal.)
Electrical Transcription of Voice Introduced As Evidence-In Gillars v. United
States, 18 U.S.L. Week 2534 (2d Cir. May 16, 1950), the court upheld the
introduction into evidence of electrical transcriptions of the defendant's speeches
made over the German radio during the war. Defendant was being tried for treason
and the transcriptions were introduced to show the content of the speeches she
had made. The court upheld this use against two major attacks. (1) Defendant
claimed that this constituted self-incrimination since he was being convicted by
records of his own voice. The court pointed out that the basis of the privilege against
self-incrimination is that a person can not be forced to tell things which will tend
to incriminate him. Here there was no compulsion. Actually, a recording like
this is no different from another witness' testimony as to what defendant had said,
or the introduction of a written statement, like a letter. (2) Defendant claimed
he had been denied his right to an open and public trial because the limited number
of headphones available for hearing the transcriptions meant that most of the spec-
tators were not able to hear them. The court examined the conduct of the trial
and found that there was no element of secrecy or limitation upon the people who
would be permitted to listen-what was being heard was not kept secret from the
other spectators, there was no organized sorting out of which spectators could use
the sets, and the press was equipped with sets in order to keep the general public
informed. Under such circumstances, there was a public trial.
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